Recent interest in voters' anti-incumbent sentiments focuses on generational change as well as public weariness with partisan control of a long duration. Theories on the electoral effects of such behaviors predict partisan cycles that suggest rising hazards of party incumbency. This article provides an analytical framework for examining changes and durations of party control in presidential elections as a discrete point process. We introduce the discrete Weibull distribution for testing contagion in the context of renewal theory and develop the notion of pseudo-periodicity for a binary process. Our findings based on this event history approach confirm the claim that party incumbency engenders rising hazards. The partisan cycles that we identified have a pseudo-period of approximately six to eight presidential terms.
Introduction
The application of survival analysis in the study of cabinet dissolution in Western democracies has created a literature that is still expanding. Most earlier research is based on the simple assumption that government collapses are determined randomly by so-called critical events, resulting in a Poisson process with constant hazard rates and exponential durations (Browne, Prendreis, and Gleiber 1984 , 1986a , 1986b Cioffi-Revilla 1984) . More recently, King, Alt, Burns and Laver (1990) , Warwick (1992a Warwick ( , 1992b and Warwick and Easton (1992) incorporate causally relevant exogenous variables into survival models based on the event approach. These studies take advantage of the increasingly popular maximum likelihood method in estimating complex models that allow for specific forms of heterogeneity and contagion.
The problem of cabinet dissolution is unique to parliamentary democracies. 1 In American politics, the closest analog is change of party control of the presidency. The study of the dynamics of this process usually takes the form of time series regressions with aggregate-level variables, specifically with party share of the vote as the dependent variable and economic and other political variables as independent variables. In other words, research on the change of government control in America is primarily based on the causal rather than the event approach. Only recently-especially after the 1992 presidential election in which "change" was a major issue-have scholars become interested in the effect of the duration of party control on election outcomes (Abramowitz 1988 (Abramowitz , 1994 Haynes and Stone 1994; Fackler and Lin 1995; Fair 1996) . Even in these studies, the duration variable, which has several versions, is examined only as an independent variable but not as a dependent variable.
The lack of interest in applying the event approach to the study of change of party control is not difficult to understand. American elections are held periodically, and hence entail a discrete time dimension for which the continuous probabilistic models used in studying European democracies are not applicable. The fact that the political universe in general, and the party system in particular, has changed over the course of American history raises concerns about heterogeneity. Moreover, even if one goes as far back as 1828, there have been only 18 uncensored party controls of the presidency to study, making it difficult to demonstrate statistical significance for empirical findings. These difficulties notwithstanding, an event history analysis of the duration of party control is important in view of recent interest in voters' anti-incumbent sentiments. By focusing on party control as the unit of analysis and studying its duration, we can examine the hazards of party incumbency beyond the confines of a single administration. A study of the durations of control is, in fact, directly related to the study of partisan cycles, a phenomenon that has intrigued generations of scholars.
2 Cycles in presidential elec-1 The problem of government survival can be generalized to nondemocratic regimes. For example, event history analysis is certainly applicable to the durations between coups in these nations.
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For example, see Schlesinger (1939 Schlesinger ( , 1949 ); Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes tions are essential to the competitiveness of our democracy because they prevent one-party dominance.
3 Cycles suggest rising hazards of party incumbency, and thus the study of such hazards entails the study of the regularity exhibited in the durations of party control.
In this article, we provide a methodological framework-discrete renewal theory-for examining these aspects of the American political process. We first introduce the concepts of hazard rate function and survival function and derive the probability mass function for durations in a discrete point process. We then introduce the discrete Weibull distribution as an especially appropriate model for testing contagion against the null model of the geometric distribution. To address the issue of cycles, we develop the notion of pseudo-periodicity as an alternative to spectral analysis for a binary process. Although related to change of party control, these discussions are mostly made in mathematical terms. A more substantive discussion is presented in a later section to address the theoretical perspectives on partisan cycles. Finally, we apply the methodology to historical data consisting of the 18 durations of party control from 1828 to 1992. Our findings demonstrate evidence of the rising hazards of party incumbency and reveal a distinctive pseudoperiodicity in presidential elections.
Discrete Renewal Theory
The analysis of event history in the social sciences has its roots in the analysis of survivability ("lifetime") in the biomedical sciences and the analysis of reliability ("failure time") in engineering (Gross and Clark 1975; Allison 1984, 12-13) . Usually the data involve the time needed for events to happen to a cross-sectional sample of individual units. When the phenomenon being inspected involves a single, longitudinal process in which events occur repeatedly under independent and identical probabilistic conditions, the process is called a renewal process (Feller 1968, chap. 13; Cox 1962) . In renewal theory, the variable of interest is then the duration between two consecutive events, or the "waiting time" for a new event to occur. Change of party control in the presidential election process is a subject of renewal theory because change is a recurrent event. Although renewal theory shares commonality with survival analysis and reliability theory, it is important to keep the time dimension in perspective. In particular, the notion of periodicity is relevant to renewal theory but not to other cross-sectional analyses of event history.
When changes occur in continuous time, as in the case of cabinet dissolutions in parliamentary democracies, probabilistic distributions of continuous random variables can be used to model political processes. Changes of party control of the presidency, however, occur in discrete time; hence a discrete probabilistic model is more appropriate (Allison 1984,14) . In this section we introduce basic concepts of discrete renewal theory to provide an analytical framework for examining changes and durations of party control in American presidential elections.
Consider a sequence of repeated Bernoulli trials represented by the random variable B t (t = 1,2,...) that takes on values 1 ("occurrence" of event) or 0 ("nonoccurrence" of event) at a discrete time point t with the Markovian probability
with Bo = 1 and t > k. In the context of presidential elections, the event in question is a change of party control. Thus, B t = 1 when, in election t, the incumbent party's candidate loses and a change of party control occurs; otherwise, B t -0. h(k) is then the conditional probability the incumbent party has of losing control in an election, given that it has been in control for k terms.
This model is a renewal process in which the trials start anew after each occurrence of an event (Feller 1968, 303) , and the Bernoulli parameter pt = P(JB% = 1) depends only on the time interval, A, since the last occurrence. In fact, h{k) is the hazard rate function generally defined as the conditional probability of an event occurring given the time period that has elapsed since the previous occurrence. For our purpose, it serves as a strikingly appropriate measure of the hazards of party incumbency.
Let the random variable D< (t = 1,2,...) denote the number of trials after occurrence i up to and including occurrence (i + 1), counting Bo = 1 as the first. The fact that pt depends only on k implies that the Di variables are independently and identically distributed. Thus, the temporal process is broken down into a random sample of DiS representing the "waiting time" for an event to occur, or the "duration" between two consecutive events. Substantively, Di is just the duration of a completed party control, with i being a sequential number in the historical period of interest. In the following, unless otherwise noted, the subscript t will be dropped for simplicity.
It is desirable to derive the probability mass function of the random variable D from a given hazard rate function h(k). For this purpose, we introduce another useful concept in renewal analysis: the survival function. Although time is discrete, the concepts of hazard and survival functions and their relationship hold the same as in the continuous-time case (Salvia and Bollinger 1982) .
The survival function, denoted as S(Jfc), is the probability that no event has occurred for k trials since the last occurrence. Formally,
In terms of the electoral process, S(k) is simply the probability that the incumbent party has survived k elections since it took control of the presidency. Note that, in general, S(k) is not complementary to h(k) as the two functions have different conditionals. Rather, S(k) is the probability of the joint event that the incumbent party has not lost any election since assuming control. Formally, S(k) can be related to h(k) as follows:
If no event has occurred for k trials since the last occurrence, the duration D must be longer than jfc. Hence, the survival function can be expressed in terms of D as
The hazard rate function can also be related to D as
We can therefore express the probability mass function for the duration in terms of the hazard rate function:
As a simple example, consider the case in which the hazard rate function is a constant; i.e.,
In this case, the survival function is of the form S(k) = (1 -p)*, while the duration D follows the well-known geometric distribution:
The Discrete WeibuU Distribution
The renewal process defined by the hazard rate function (1) is not "contagious" because the B t variables are simply i.i.d. Bernoulli variables with parameter p. The occurrence of an event is not in any way dependent on the outcomes of previous trials. For our investigation on the electoral effect of party incumbency, such a model serves as a "null model" as it essentially assumes no effect from the outcomes of previous elections. More generally, however, repeated Bernoulli trials can be contagious because at each trial, the probability of an event occurring can be affected by the outcomes of previous trials. The hazard rate function in (1) is but a degenerate and very restrictive case. In situations in which contagion between trials is relevant, it is often desirable to model the process flexibly such that the dependence of the hazard rate function on fc can be adjusted by fine tuning certain parameters. In this regard, the following functional form for the hazard rate is particularly useful:
with 0 < p < 1 and /3 > 0. (2) is a generalization of (1) in the sense that it allows for different behaviors in the hazard rate. It is easy to verify that /i(l) = p, so that the probability of occurrence immediately after the last occurrence is always p. /? determines the form of contagion such that h(k) is strictly increasing in Jf c if 0 > 1 and strictly decreasing if P < 1. When 0 = 1, then h(k) = p as in (1), and contagion disappears.
The hazard rate function in (2) is an ideal model for the hazards of party incumbency in a sequence of elections. If incumbency status has any effect at all on election outcomes, this model is certainly more appropriate than (1). Furthermore, 0 > 1 corresponds to the situation in which incumbency entails rising hazards, whereas 0 < 1 posits increasing electoral advantages for the party in control.
The survival function corresponding to the specification of the hazard rate in (2) can be determined as follows:
3=1
which is a generalization of the geometric survival function with the addition of the acceleration parameter /3. The probability mass function for durations is
with 0 < p < 1 and /? > 0. This is called the discrete Weibull distribution because it resembles the better known Weibull distribution for continuous random variables (Nakagawa and Osakd 1975; Kokoska and Nevison 1989) . When 0 = 1, the discrete Weibull distribution degenerates into the geometric distribution.
An appropriate expression for the expected value of D follows from the definition of expectation for a discrete random variable:
For /? > 1 it is easy to see that this is a finite quantity. Indeed, in this case every term for k > 1 in the summation is smaller than or equal to /? = 1, the degenerate case. Figure 1 plots the probability mass function for several parameter combinations. Figure 2 plots the hazard rate function. Note the rising shape for 0 > 1. The discrete Weibull distribution facilitates the application of discrete renewal theory to periodically held elections by allowing contagion to be addressed in an efficient way. As will be elaborated later, theories of voting behavior clearly indicate that presidential elections are not independent of each other, and incumbency status has major effects on election outcomes. By allowing the hazard rate to increase or decrease over the course of a duration of party control, it is now possible to examine such effects in the framework of renewal theory.
In fact, the nesting relationship between the geometric distribution and the discrete Weibull distribution provides the possibility to conduct a powerful test of contagion. Without a specific alternative to the null hypothesis, the usual chi-square test for the goodness of fit of the geometric distribution is dismally weak (Cochran 1954) . With the more general discrete Weibull distribution, it is now possible to examine whether the hazard rate is a constant by testing Ho : /9 = 1 against H^ : @ > 1 (or Hx :/?<!). Even for a small sample, when the maximum likeli- hood estimates do not enjoy all the asymptotic properties, one can still compare the geometric distribution with a specific discrete Weibull distribution and decide which model gives a better fit. In sum, the discrete Weibull distribution provides not only more theoretical flexibility but also greater empirical testability. Note that even though the discrete Weibull hazard rate can allow for contagion in the Bernoulli trials (B t ), the durations (£>*) are still independently and identically distributed, and hence the process remains a renewal process. In analyzing a long historical process, however, the researcher may suspect heterogeneity among the durations. Like other event history models, one way of introducing heterogeneity is to relate either E(Di) or a parameter 6i to a vector of exogenous variables or covariates x* whose values change from duration to duration. 4 In the case of the discrete Weibull distribution, since E(Di) does not have a closed form, a suitable parametrization would be either # = exp (xjcti) or pi = 1/1 + exp (2^0:2), where Qi and aj are vectors of constant pa-*ln the study of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies, King, Alt, Burns and Laver (1990) was the first to combine covariates with Poisson process models.
rameters. Maximum likelihood estimates can then be obtained using standard statistical packages. Such a "discrete Weibull regression" approach is not limited to renewal processes. The model can certainly be applied to the study of lifetime or failure time in cross-sectional political analyses.
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Pseudo-periodicity When the occurrences of events are independent and identical Bernoulli random variables, the times at which n events occur in a fixed time period (l,r) should be uniformly distributed. Formally, the random variables Ti [i = 1,2,..., n) representing the discrete time U (measured from the origin) at which the t-th event occurs are independent variates with the discrete uniform distribution, conditional on the number of events in (l,i) being equal to n (Barnard 1953; Lewis 1965 ). An implication of this result is that when the durations are geometrically distributed, there should be no regular pattern in the recurrence of events.
Conversely, regularity in the recurrence of events reflects contagion in the form of an increasing hazard function. In particular, electoral cycles are apparently associated with rising hazards of party incumbency. In their pure form, periodic recurrent events imply constant durations; that is, Di becomes a degenerate random variable with probability mass equal to one at the constant duration, say, P. Correspondingly, the hazard rate function h(k) is a step function with h(k) = 0 for Jf c < P and h(k) = 1 for Jfc > P. Thus, cycle is a legitimate concept in renewal theory. But since no one expects electoral cycles to perpetuate at fixed intervals, an appropriate question to ask is then: How should renewal theory address a cyclical pattern when it is less than perfect? That is, when the hazard rate is not a step function but is increasing continuously as it approaches one, what can renewal theory say about patterns of recurrence that lie between complete randomness and perfect periodicity?
In time-series analysis, a similar question is answered by the notion of "pseudo-periodicity." Theoretically, a time series can be decomposed into a sum of various harmonics (i.e., sinusoidal components) with different amplitudes and frequencies. In frequency-domain time series 5 For example, in studying the advantage of individual congressmen in seeking reelection, it is conceivable that a "discrete Weibull regression" can be used to relate the tenure of a former congressman to a vector of covariates that are explanatory. In this case, a discrete model is appropriate because congressional tenure is measured in number of terms, and the discrete Weibull distribution is relevant because incumbency advantage implies contagion. Note that the tenures of congressmen who left office due to scandal, retirement, death, etc., are "censored" and have to be dealt with differently from those of congressmen who were defeated in their reelection bids.
analysis, the Fourier transform of the autocorrelation function (acf) of a time series reveals the amplitudes ("power") of these harmonics at all frequencies, a relationship that is reflected in the so-called power spectrum (Chatfield 1989, chap. 7) . A peak in a continuous spectrum thus indicates that a particular frequency has a dominant role in the composition of the time series. In statistical terms, the frequency "explains" a significant proportion of the variation in the time series. A time series with a continuous power spectrum that peaks conspicuously is said to exhibit pseudo-periodic behavior at the corresponding frequency (or period) because its time path shows the appearance of moderately regular cycles (Box and Jenkins 1976, 59; Fuller 1976, 55-56) . Pseudo-periodic behavior is characteristic of certain stochastic processes such as autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) processes under certain conditions. Dynamics of such a nature was first discussed, independently, by Yule (1927) and Slutzky (1937) and is thus also referred to as the "Slutzky-Yule effect."
Although spectral analysis can be used to analyze binary data such as those generated by a sequence of repeated Bernoulli trials, the decomposition of a binary variable into sinusoidal components is difficult to interpret. 6 As mentioned above, the perfect cycle in a discrete event process corresponds to the recurrences of ones (i.e., events) at constant durations, a discrete, periodic impulse wave rather than a continuous, sinusoidal one. However, it is not difficult to imagine that a binary sequence can be decomposed into such cycles with various periods, one of which may be dominant. It is with this analogy to spectral analysis that we develop the concept of pseudo-periodicity for a renewal process.
Definition. Let h e (P, •) denote the hazard rate function of a discrete renewal process with all durations equal to P. According to the definition of hazard rate function, i.e., h e (P, •) is a step-function taking value 0 for Jb < P and value 1 for k > P. P is called the period of the process. Let H = {h e (P, ),P = 1,2,...} denote the family of all hazard rate functions for periodic renewal processes.
For a renewal process with a strictly increasing hazard rate function h(-) that is not a step function, the pseudo-period of the process is defined in terms of the member of H whose functional form is the "closest" to /i(-). In the following formal definition, we use the L 2 -nonn as a measure of the "distance" between two functions f\ and /j. Note that the definition does not require durations to follow the discrete Weibull distribution, but for a discrete Weibull process, it requires that /3>1.
Definition. For a renewal process with a strictly increasing hazard rate function /i(),
is called the pseudo-period of the process. That is, Po is the value of P at which the distance between h e (P, •) and /»(•) is at a minimum in terms of the L 2 -norm.
We now develop three propositions concerning the pseudo-periodicity of a renewal process. Their proofs are given in Appendix 1.
PROPOSITION 1. P o is the pseudo-period for a renewal process with a strictly increasing hazard rate function h(-) if and only if PQ is the smallest integer such that h(Po) > £.
This proposition provides a very convenient way for identifying the pseudo-period of a renewal process with a strictly increasing hazard rate function. For example, from Figure 2 it is easy to see that for the two discrete Weibull processes with increasing hazard rates, one (p = .4, 0 = 1.2) has a pseudo-period of 3, and the other (p = .001, £ = 4.7) has a pseudo-period of 5. The definition of pseudo-period, however, does not imply that the pseudo-cycle identified is necessarily distinctively dominant. In these two examples, the pseudo-periodicity in the first process is certainly not as distinctive as the pseudo-periodicity in the second process, as the hazard rate function of the latter is much closer to the step function 1*>5 than that of the former is to 1*>3. Nevertheless, if any pattern of recurrence is to be found within a process, the notion of pseudo-periodicity as defined above provides a way of identification.
Note that a geometric process can be considered as a degenerate case so far as pseudo-periodicity is concerned. The process has a constant hazard rate function, and hence the definition of pseudo-period is not applicable. However, if we imagine that parallel lines intersect at infinity, then the pseudo-period of a geometric process can be considered as equal to infinity. That is, the geometric process is acyclic.
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Since a perfectly cyclic process has a period that is equal to the constant duration, one may be tempted to relate pseudo-period to expected duration. The two, however, do not correspond to the same concept. Indeed, it is important that pseudo-period is not equated with expected duration, conceptually or mathematically. In the case of the geometric process, the expected duration exists and is equal to 1/p. Had expected duration been equated with pseudo-period, the geometric process would have been pseudo-periodic. The difference between the two concepts is made clear by the following propositions specific to the discrete Weibull process. 
That is, the pseudo-period is always greater than the expected duration minus 1.
Proposition 2 is trivial: because /i(l) = p > 1/2, the pseudo-period is equal to one, which is the minimum possible duration for any discrete event process. Proposition 3 is more interesting, for it shows that for an important class of discrete Weibull processes, the pseudo-period has a lower bound around the expected duration. Since the pseudo-period is an integer while the expected duration is generally not, the former sometimes falls below the latter, but not by more than one period. For example, the discrete Weibull process with p = .001 and 0 = 4.7 has a pseudo-period of 5 which is greater than the expected duration, 4.4776. However, when 0 is increased to 4.92 to accelerate the hazard rate, the pseudo-period is reduced to 4, smaller than the expected duration, now 4.2345. Obviously, the quantum drop in the pseudo-period exceeds the continuous decrease in the expected duration. Except for this "rounding" problem, the pseudo-period is greater and can be much greater than the expected duration for discrete Weibull processes with p < 1/2 and 0 > 1. In the case that p = .02 and 0 = 2, for example, the hazard 7 In applying spectral analysis to simulated binary event data, we find that, whether p is greater or smaller than 1/2, the geometric process always exhibits a spectrum that is not statistically different from that of a white noise. In contrast, the general discrete Weibull process with f) > 1 often exhibits significant pseudoperiodicity in the conventional sense. rate function rises gradually to approach 1/2, giving a pseudo-period of 18, compared with an expected duration of 6.7337. Such a long pseudocycle will not be identifiable in an empirical process with just a few dozen observations.
Contagion in Presidential Elections
The methodological framework introduced above allows us to examine contagion and pseudo-periodicity in a discrete point process such as change of party control in presidential elections. To ask whether elections are contagious is seemingly innocuous. In the literature, however, vastly different perspectives lead to different expectations concerning regime change in European democracies and change in party control for the American presidency. In any case, it is important to understand the theoretical reason for contagion or the lack thereof.
In the study of cabinet stability in comparative politics, a "critical events" approach has been proposed to examine the dissolutions of cabinet governments in European democracies. Browne, Frendreis and Gleiber (1984 , 1986a , 1986b suggest that the causes of cabinet collapse come from a broad spectrum of exogenous shocks, which they call "critical events." Besides regular and unscheduled elections, critical events may take the form of scandals, assassinations, economic calamities, social or cultural upheavals, international incidents, voter referenda, strikes, interparty or intraparty disputes, etc. These random shocks, due to their heterogeneous and exogenous nature, are generally assumed to be mutually independent. From such a perspective, the duration of cabinet governments is considered similar to the lifetime of individuals or the failure time of devices and is subject to survival/reliability analysis. The probabilistic model that follows the assumption of random causes is the exponential distribution, which implies a constant hazard rate for government survival.
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A direct application of such an approach to the change of party control of the presidency in America is apparently naive. But the fact that presidential elections are held periodically over a relatively long historical period motivates a discrete-time renewal analysis. Under similar assumptions about the causes of change (viz., random critical events), the duration of party control should follow a geometric distribution. But there are several theoretical difficulties in accepting such a model of constant hazards.
First, causal analyses of presidential election outcomes, in particu- lar the longitudinal analysis of economic voting (Fair 1978; 1982; 1996; Fackler and Lin 1995) , have shown that incumbent presidents running for reelection have a substantial advantage. More recently, causal analysts have also begun to incorporate in their equations independent variables representing the duration of party control. The general finding is that longer party incumbency incurs disadvantages for reelection, probably attributable to the electorate's weariness of a long duration of partisan control and the consequent yearning for a change (Abramowitz 1988 (Abramowitz , 1994 Haynes and Stone 1994; Fackler and Lin 1995; Fair 1996) . Although these studies are based on party shares of the vote rather than the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a change of control, their findings suggest that consecutive elections are contagious in some way and far from independent of each other. Independence, as we have seen, is a fundamental assumption for a sequence of Bernoulli trials to give rise to geometric durations and constant hazards.
Second, geometric durations imply acyclicity. The same assumptions that lead to geometric durations necessitate that changes of party control occur randomly in history, with the time of occurrence following a discrete uniform distribution. Under such assumptions one should expect only random ups and downs in the political fortunes of the parties, but not electoral cycles of any regularity. Although no political scientists believe in fixed-interval electoral cycles, it is nonetheless dear to many that the electoral process exhibits certain regularities that deviate from a random pattern.
There are generally two schools of thought about the nonrandom forces that regulate the alternation of party control: one based on the negative public reaction to the party in power, and the other based on generational effects. The former is represented by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) , Stokes and Iversen (1962) and Sellers (1965) . The theory holds that "restoring forces" generated by negative voting tend to drive party competition toward an equilibrium level, thus generating "equilibrium cycles." As Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960, 554) put it, "A majority party, once it is in office, will not continue to accrue electoral strength; it may preserve for a time its electoral majority, but the next marked change in the party vote will issue from a negative response of the electorate to some aspect of the party's conduct in office, a response that tends to return the minority party to power." This phenomenon is a result of the interaction of three factors: the coalition-of-minorities, logrolling nature of party politics (Dahl 1956; Downs 1957; Miller 1983) ; the tradeoffs inherent in national policy alternatives such as inflation versus unemployment, liberalism versus conservatism, and other partisan cleavages (Schlesinger 1986; Hibbs 1987, chaps. 5 and 7) ; and the asymmetry between the electoral consequences of positive and negative responses to policy outcomes (Bloom and Price 1975; Kernell 1977; Lau 1985) . The longer a party is in control, the more likely that negative policy outcomes and the public reaction to them will erode the majority coalition, and hence the higher its electoral hazards.
The generation theory is most conspicuously represented by Beck (1974 Beck ( ,1979 . It builds upon the observation that enduring psychological attachment to political parties occasioned by historical events tends to erode over the generations, providing opportunities for a new generation to be mobilized into new partisan attachments. The two theories of political cycles are not mutually exclusive, however. In fact, the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1986) observes cycles of national involvement in public purpose and private interest that are driven by both the negativity effects and the generational effects. For Schlesinger, a sustained national involvement inevitably generates frustration, disillusion and emotional exhaustion before running out its course. It is the dynamics of these internal forces that evoke the urge in the new generation to displace and replace the generation in power.
The seemingly regular cycles that both theories observe are actually pseudo-cycles characteristic of certain stochastic processes. For example, for the Democratic share of the two-party vote (A) from 1828 to 1992, an AR (2) where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 9 Note that the sign for the coefficient of D t -\ is positive and that of D t -2 is negative. For a Democratic Party that has been in control, the positive sign is indicative of some advantage over the Whig or Republican Party because D t -i, which has a positive coefficient, is greater than .5. For a Democratic Party that has been in control for two terms or more, however, the incumbency advantage is offset by a "second-term disadvantage" because now D t -2 > .5 and the sign of its coefficient is negative. The negative second-term effect in combination with the positive first-term 'including the 1996 election in the regression changes the estimates only slightly. Historical values of Dt were calculated from data provided in Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections (1985). Except for the 1836 election, when all three Whig candidates were counted toward the total Whig votes, only the official candidates of the two major parties were included in the calculation of Dt. effect generates pseudo-cycles. The power spectrum of D t shows a peak at angular frequency tJo = .98, corresponding to a pseudo-period of P o = 2T/WO = 6.41. Around the peak, the periods at which the spectral density function (sdf) is significantly different from the white noise level range from 5.26 to 7.94 in elections, or (21.04,31.76) in years (see Figure  3) . Overall, the spectrum is clearly different from that of a white noise, which would have occured were elections independent. Similar results can be obtained when the Whig or Republican share of the two-party vote is analyzed. These results are consistent with Midlarsky (1984) , who identifies a 28-year cycle for presidential elections 1860-1980 on the basis of a time-domain analysis. In a sociological context, Carlsson and Karlsson (1970) also derive a finite moving average (MA) model for generationrelated behavior that suggests a Slutzky-Yule pseudo-cycle of roughly 25 years in what they call the "generation of generations." In arguing for the existence of pseudo-cycles, both the negative public reaction theory and the generation theory imply rising hazards of party incumbency. They differ only in the focus of their behavioral explanations. Thus, a geometric model for the duration of party control that is associated with a random pattern of recurrence and constant hazard rates is inconsistent with these theories of electoral behavior.
The Rising Hazards of Party Incumbency
Given the strong theoretical expectation that elections are contagious and that party incumbency incurs rising hazards, a renewal analysis on the change of party control of the presidency based on the discrete Weibull distribution is more appropriate. The discrete Weibull distribution subsumes the geometric distribution and provides a test of whether the hazard rates are indeed increasing. In a discrete model of the electoral process, a change of party control is considered an occurrence of an event, while the duration of party control, in number of presidential terms, is the interval between two consecutive occurrences. The hazard rate can be interpreted as the probability that, conditional on the number of terms the incumbent party has been in control, a change of control will occur at the next presidential election. Thus, an increasing hazard rate function is an indication that the probability of losing is rising with the duration of party incumbency.
We estimate the event model for the historical period from 1829 to 1992, during which there were 18 uncensored party controls.
10 With the election of Andrew Jackson, 1828 marked the beginning not only of a truly national Democratic Party but also of an electorally competitive party system. Although we consider the Whigs as the predecessor of the Republican Party with respect to alternations of party control, as far as the duration of control is concerned, the label of a party is of consequence only if heterogeneity is suspected. In analyzing an extended historical period, heterogeneity indeed should be a concern. In other words, the parameters of the discrete Weibull distribution (or any other survival distribution) might be related to some time-dependent covariates, e.g., sociological, economic, and political independent variables including the party in control as well as the party system to which a duration of control belonged. Although such event history regression models are estimatable by the maximum likelihood method, we do not have enough data to carry out the procedure in a statistically efficient way. Consequently, we have to assume that the effect of the electorate's weariness with an extended duration of partisan control and its corresponding sense of national involvement is more or less time-invariant. Our results depend on this assumption of homogeneity. To justify the applicability of renewal analysis, we first note that the hypothesis of independence of the 18 empirical durations cannot be rejected by testing the statistical significance of the autocorrelation function of the time series. The maximum likelihood estimates for the discrete Weibull distribution are p = 0.3826 and /3 = 1.1829. So the point estimate of f) is indeed greater than 1, and the hazard rate function increases with the number of terms the incumbent party has been in control of the presidency. With only 18 observations, however, one can hardly expect an estimate like $ to have a small standard error. Indeed, TnaYimnm likelihood gives $ a standard error of .2759, implying that the point estimate is not statistically different from 1, the value at which the discrete Weibull distribution degenerates into the geometric distribution. When the geometric distribution is fit to the duration data, p = .4390.
To provide more confidence for the alternative hypothesis B.A '• 0 > 1 against the null hypothesis Ho : P = 1, the expected frequencies for the estimated geometric distribution and discrete Weibull distribution are calculated and presented in Table 1 . The results show that the fit of the discrete Weibull distribution does improve substantially upon that of the geometric distribution. In fact, the discrete Weibull distribution gives an almost perfect fit. Table 1 also gives the theoretical hazard rates for the estimated dis-Crete Weibull distribution. Interestingly, the rate exceeds .5 somewhere between k = 3 and k = 4, corresponding to a pseudo-period of four terms by our definition. Since the hazard rate is the probability that the incumbent party will lose an election in the course of a duration of control, .5 can be considered as a level beyond which incumbency is losing its advantage. Thus, although an incumbent party does enjoy a substantial electoral advantage at the first term (/i(l) = .3826), and even the second term (/i(2) = .4581), the advantage almost vanishes at the end of the third term (A(3) = .4903), with incumbency turning into a liability after that. Based on this interpretation, ceteris paribus, a party can expect to remain in control for three to four terms solely by virtue of its incumbency advantage, amounting to a partisan pseudocycle of about six to eight terms. This result is remarkably consistent with the pseudo-periodic behavior observed in the time-series analysis of the party share of the presidential vote.
We present a heuristic model here to explore further the notion of pseudo-cycles in a renewal process. Remember that pseudo-periodicity in both conventional time series analysis and our discussion of renewal analysis refers to a dominant periodic component of a stochastic process. We demonstrate the existence of a distinctively dominant seven-election cycle in the alternation of party control of the presidency by the following correlational analysis. A "party-in-control" series is constructed to represent the party in control of the presidency for each presidential term from 1829 to 1996, using '0' to denote the Whig or Republican Party and '1' the Democratic Party. The (empirical) series is labeled as series P in Table 2 . In addition, a set of binary series representing a spectrum of feasible fixed-interval periodic alternations are given in Table 2 with the labels P2, P3, ... , P10, with the period of series PN being N. These PN series are among the possible periodic components of P. The problem is to identify a PN that can account for a substantial proportion of the variation in P. If such a PN can be found, we can say that there is a hidden cycle of period N in the process of which P is a realization.
The task is achieved by computing the cross-correlations between P and each of the nine PN series. From the correlation matrix shown in Table 2 , it is clear that P7 correlates with P with significant magnitudes for most of its lags. In particular, P7(t -6) has a correlation coefficient with P of 0.50, implying that one quarter of the variation in P can be explained by a seven-term cyclical model with, except for the initial period, four Democratic administrations followed by three Republican administrations. As it turns out, the model correctly predicts 31 out of 42 presidential elections from 1828 to 1992, and 32 out of 43 if the 1996 election is included. The 11 errors are relatively evenly distributed, falling in the elections of 1844, I860, 1864, 1880, 1888, 1908, 1920, 1932, 1960, 1968 and 1972 . Against a guess of straight zeroes, the mode of the distribution, the model increases the number of correct predictions by eight. Such improvement corresponds to a Kruskal's TJ, = 8/19 = 0.42, or 42 percent reduction of errors (Blalock 1979, 309) .
Conclusion
When Bill Clinton was elected president in 1992, predictions abounded that a new liberal phase had come into being in American politics. George Bush's loss was widely interpreted as a result of the voters' weariness of the Reagan Era-more than a decade of national involvement in what Schlesinger calls "private interest." Schlesinger wrote in the Wall Street Journal (Nov. 12, 1992) Time, Nov. 21, 1994, 34 ). Clinton's reelection in 1996, however, continues the Democratic phase of the partisan cycle in presidential elections.
But even Schlesinger knows that "there is no mathematical determinism in history" (1986, 45) . In this article, we proposed a probabilistic approach to study the dynamics of change. We developed a discrete analysis of renewal processes generated by a sequence of possibly contagious Bernoulli trials. In adopting a longitudinal perspective, we were able to address partisan cycles in a nnnHpt.prminiHt.ir fashion. We argued that when contagion involves rising hazards, a renewal process should exhibit pseudo-periodicity. Applying our approach to the change of party control of the presidency in American history, we found that, as expected by theories of voting behavior, party incumbency indeed incurred rising hazards. Our estimate of the pseudo-period of the event process turns out to be consistent with conventional observations, but the stochastic nature of the analysis averts the fallacy of historical determinism.
The longitudinal study of American elections has been dominated by a causal approach relating election outcomes to exogenous, especially economic, variables. The recent attention to the effect of the duration of control on vote choice attests to the importance of incorporating event history into the study of voting behavior. Our article provides an ana-lytic framework within which this can be done to account for the unique institutional context of American elections. Since g(k) = 1 -h(k), the inequalities imply that, respectively, h(Po -1) < 1/2 and h(P 0 ) > 1/2. If an integer Jfc* does not exist such that h(k m ) = 1/2, the only integer that satisfies both inequalities is the smallest integer P o such that h(P 0 ) > 1/2. In the rare case that an integer Jfc* exists such that h(k') = 1/2, both P o = Jfc* and P o = Jfc* +1 satisfy both inequalities. In this case PQ = Jfc* is chosen to be the pseudo-period.
• Proof. Let PQ be the pseudo-period of the process and q = 1 -p. Then
The last inequality is true since, for all j such that P o < j, The last inequality is based on the fact that qi < 1. Thus, P o > E(D) -1.
•
